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Abstract
Automated negotiation is a powerful (and sometimes essential) means for allocating resources
among self-interested autonomous software agents. A key problem in building negotiating agents is
the design of the negotiation strategy, which is used by an agent to decide its negotiation behaviour.
In complex domains, there is no single, obvious optimal strategy. This has le4d to much work on
designing heuristic strategies, where agent designers usually rely on intuition and experience. In this
paper, we introduce STRATUM, a methodology for designing strategies for negotiating agents. The
methodology provides a disciplined approach to analysing the negotiation environment and designing
strategies in light of agent capabilities, and acts as a bridge between theoretical studies of automated
negotiation and the software engineering of negotiation applications. We illustrate the application
of the methodology by characterising some strategies for the Trading Agent Competition and for
argumentation-based negotiation.
1 Introduction
Computer systems are increasingly being viewed in terms of multiple, interacting autonomous agents.
This is because the multi-agent paradigm oers a powerful set of metaphors, concepts and techniques for
conceptualising, designing, implementing and verifying complex distributed systems (Jennings, 2001). In
this context, an agent is viewed as an encapsulated computer system that is situated in an environment
and is capable of exible, autonomous action in order to meet its design objectives (Wooldridge, 2002).
Building upon this, applications of agent technology have ranged from electronic trading and distributed
business process management, to air-trac and industrial control, to health care and patient monitoring,
to gaming and interactive entertainment (Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998; Parunak, 1999; Luck et al.,
2003).
In more detail, in a multi-agent system (MAS), agents need to interact. For example, when agents are
cooperative (e.g. coordinating robots in a disaster rescue application), they need to communicate in order
to obtain a shared view of the environment and to coordinate their activities eectively (Tambe et al.,
2005). In applications where agents are self-interested (e.g. in a trading environment), they also need to
interact in order to negotiate and agree on resource exchanges. In many such applications, communication
is essential due to the lack of central coordination or resource allocation mechanisms.
We oer the following denition of negotiation, adapted from work on the philosophy of argumentation
(Walton and Krabbe, 1995):
Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents, with conicting interests and
a desire to cooperate, try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the division of scarce
resources.
The use of the word \resources" in the denition above is to be taken in the broadest possible sense. Thus,
resources can be commodities, services, time, money etc. In short, anything that is needed to achieveSTRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 3
something. Resources are \scarce" since competing claims over them cannot be fully simultaneously
satised. In a multi-agent system context, the challenge of automated negotiation is to design mechanisms
for allocating resources among software processes representing self-interested parties, be these parties
human individuals, organisations, or other software processes.
To date, various interaction and decision mechanisms for automated negotiation have been proposed
and studied. These include: game-theoretic analysis (Kraus, 2001; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Sand-
holm, 2002); heuristic-based approaches (Faratin, 2000; Fatima et al., 2002; Kowalczyk and Bui, 2001);
and argumentation-based approaches (Kraus et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998; Sierra et al., 1998).
A central feature of all these negotiation mechanisms is that agents have some choice of what they
may utter, and possibly when they may make utterances. Open-cry auction participants, for example,
choose both the content of their utterances (within the constraints of the particular auction protocol)
and the timing of their utterances; participants in a sealed-bid, single-round auction may only choose
the content. In argumentation-based approaches, participants have still greater freedom in their choice
of the content (covering issues such as threats, promises, appeals, etc.) and timing of utterances.
Given this range of options, agent designers therefore face an important question:
What should an agent say, and when, in a particular negotiation interaction?
To answer this question, we turn to the realm of negotiation strategies which are here dened as rules or
algorithms which provide an answer to this question.
Now for certain types of negotiation frameworks, game theory can be used to characterise optimal
strategies and predict the outcomes of a game (Binmore and Vulkan, 1997). However, it has been argued
that game-theoretic approaches are insucient for designing strategies in complex domains (Jennings
et al., 2001). This leaves a gap to be lled, as there are no structured approaches to designing strategies
for such complex domains. In fact, most strategies in such frameworks have thus far been designed by
resorting more or less to intuition and experience. To rectify this, we present a methodology which guides
agent designers in the design and selection of strategies for agents engaged in negotiation interactions.
The methodology provides a disciplined approach to analysing the negotiation environment and designing
strategies in light of agent capabilities.
The paper advances the state of the art in automated negotiation in two main ways. Firstly, the paper
presents the rst structured methodology for guiding agent designers in designing and selecting strategies
in complex, open negotiation domains. Here we exemplify such domains by considering the Trading
Agent Competition and argumentation-based negotiation. Secondly, the methodology presents a step
towards understanding the common underlying principles of negotiation strategies in various complex
domains. This has the potential to enable agent designers to reuse strategies or strategy components
across multiple domains and select between strategies based on the characteristics of a given domain.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 4
Hence, our methodology can act as a bridge between the theoretical and simulation-based studies of
automated negotiation on one hand, and the software engineering of practical applications of automated
negotiation on the other.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we motivate the need for a strategy
design methodology. In Section 3, we present the STRATUM methodology for strategy design. Then,
in Section 4, we demonstrate how the methodology can be applied by considering two case studies: one
from the Trading Agent Competition (Eriksson and Janson, 2002); the other from argumentation-based
negotiation (Rahwan et al., 2003). We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Why a Methodology is Needed
In this section, we motivate the need for a strategy design methodology. In the next subsection, we
demonstrate that the analytical approach of game-theory is not suitable in certain domains. Then, we
also demonstrate why agent-oriented software engineering methodologies fall short of providing structure
to the strategy design process. The last subsection scopes the contribution of the paper in light of these
observations.
2.1 Relation to Automated Negotiation Approaches
Researchers in the area of MAS initially used the tools of classical game theory to design strategies for
negotiating agents (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). In game-theoretic analysis, researchers typically
attempt to determine the optimal strategy by analysing the interaction as a game between participants
and seeking its equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1956; von Stengel, 2002). The strategy determined by these
methods is typically shown to be optimal for a participant, given the game rules, the assumed payos
and preferences of participants, and assuming that agents have common knowledge that they are all
rational1 and that participants have no knowledge of one another not provided by introspection. In such
cases, it is possible to use game-theoretic techniques in order to design resource allocation mechanisms
that force agents to follow prescribed optimal strategies (Dash et al., 2003).
However, it quickly turned out that the assumptions of game theory are often not satised in multi-
agent systems (Jennings et al., 2001). The results of classical game theory (e.g. about the optimal
strategies) are only valid under the assumptions of perfect rationality.2 However, in real applications,
agents may be resource-constrained, malicious or whimsical, or simply badly-coded, so that participant
1Rational in the sense that they try to maximise their expected utilities, that their preferences satisfy certain axiomatic
conditions, and that their decisions assume that other agents are also rational.
2Some work has be done on calculating equilibrium strategies while taking into account the cost of computation (Larson
and Sandholm, 2001). However, this approach has been applied to a particular, relatively simple bilateral bargaining setting,
and it is not clear yet how this approach generalises to more complex negotiations (e.g. involving multiple concurrent
negotiations).STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 5
behaviour may not conform to the assumptions of economic rationality. In such cases, researchers have
turned to heuristic methods. Heuristics are rules of thumb that produce \good enough" outcomes, and
are mainly based on empirical testing and evaluation. In heuristic-based frameworks, strategies have been
proposed which are based on, for example, the underlying utility model, decay functions of factors such
as utility and time (Faratin, 2000; Kraus, 2001), or fuzzy modelling of the environment (He et al., 2003).
Very specic bargaining strategies have been analyzed, for example, by investigating their optimality
(Fatima et al., 2001), their performance in multiple negotiation rounds (Faratin, 2000), or the resulting
social welfare (Harsanyi, 1956).
However, there is no \methodology" for guiding designers of strategies in heuristic-based frameworks.
So, given a new type of negotiation domain, such as the travel services market of the Trading Agent
Competition (TAC) (TAC, 2003), there is little guidance on how one might go about designing negotiation
strategles.
Another type of framework which challenge game theoretic approaches is what is becoming known
as the argument-based negotiation approach (Rahwan et al., 2003). In these frameworks, agents can
exchange, in addition to proposals and indications of their acceptance or rejection, other meta-information
about proposals, such as the reasons for proposals, and the reasons for accepting or rejecting them. Here,
strategies were also proposed on an ad hoc basis (Sierra et al., 1998; Sadri et al., 2001) possibly inspired
by the psychology of human persuasion (Kraus et al., 1998; Ramchurn et al., 2003). Thus, there has been
little work that investigates generic principles underlying these heuristics.
While the game-theoretic approach is well understood, we are motivated by the lack of methodology
for guiding designers of strategies in heuristic-based or argumentation-based negotiation encounters. It
would be of value, therefore, to provide a methodology that gives generic guidelines for strategy designers
operating under such frameworks. To this end, this paper takes the rst step towards characterising a
methodology for designing strategies under complex protocols and relaxed assumptions. Thus, given a
specic heuristic or argumentation-based encounter described in terms of interaction rules and a set of
agents participating in negotiation, the methodology would assist agent designers in distilling essential
features of the framework and using these to incrementally design sophisticated strategies.
2.2 Relation to AOSE Methodologies
In recent years, there has been an increase in research on Agent-Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE)
methodologies. A number of AOSE methodologies have been proposed for guiding the design and con-
struction of multi-agent systems, such as GAIA (Zambonelli et al., 2003; Wooldridge et al., 2000), Tropos
(Bresciani et al., 2004), ROADMAP (Juan et al., 2002), Prometheus (Padgham and Winiko, 2004)
OperA (Dignum, 2004) and AUML (Bauer et al., 2001). One might reasonably ask whether AOSE
methodologies could provide the answer to the problem of strategy design for protocols that cannot be
studied using game-theoretic tools.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 6
Now there have been some attempts to use or produce AOSE methodologies to engineer negotia-
tion protocols and agents. For example, Ashri et al. (2003) use the SMART agent construction model
(d'Inverno and Luck, 2001) to specify negotiating agent architectures. Fritschi and Dorer (2002) use an
AOSE methodology to construct an agent that participated in the Trading Agent Competition. Kungas
and Rao (2004) present a methodology for agent-based Web service discovery and automated composi-
tion using negotiation. Dumas et al. (2002) propose a formal language for specifying negotiating agent
behaviour, which combines State Charts (Harel and Naamad, 1996) and Defeasible Logic Programs
(Billington, 1993).
However, AOSE methodologies are typically concerned with the process of capturing domain require-
ments before the agent system exists, and then transforming these requirements into multi-agent system
specications. During this process, system designers can follow the methodology as they describe the
environment, agent capabilities, roles, relationship structures, interaction protocols, and so on. When it
comes to specifying agents, current AOSE methodologies usually assume that agents are specied by the
same designer or, if specied by multiple designers, that they are cooperative. In an open system, where
agents can be programmed by anyone, and cannot be assumed cooperative, current AOSE methodologies
provide no advice on the design of negotiation strategies.
The methodology we present here should not be seen as a competitor to existing AOSE method-
ologies, when they are applied to specifying open negotiation environments. Instead, our methodology
complements AOSE methodologies since we assume a multi-agent system specication is partially given
(implicitly or explicitly) using some language, and we provide guidance to an agent designer in program-
ming strategies which operate within the given specication.
2.3 Scope
In this subsection, we dene more precisely the scope of this paper. This requires a characterisation of
the various components of a negotiation framework. A negotiation framework can be seen to involve the
following (Bartolini et al., 2002):
1. a negotiation locale, which is a communication platform through which agents interact;
2. a host (or monitor) that manages the negotiation locale and facilitates the negotiation, making
sure participants abide by the protocol rules, pay violation nes etc.;
3. a negotiation template, which is essentially a language for describing deals;
4. a set of negotiation rules, which include:
(a) rules for participant admission;
(b) rules for checking proposal validity;STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 7
Negotiation Rules￿
Locale￿
Negotiation Template￿
Host/Monitor￿
Participant￿
Communication Technologies,￿
Authentication, Security Models￿
Ontologies￿ & Bidding Languages￿
Mechanism Design,￿
Dialogue Game Protocols￿
Agent Architecture￿
Negotiation Strategies￿
AOSE￿ Methodologies￿
Agent programming languages￿
STRATUM￿
Elements of Negotiation Framework￿
Figure 1: Scope of the STRATUM methodology
(c) rules for protocol enforcement, which include rules that specify when agents can make propos-
als, accept proposals, make other utterances etc.;
(d) rules for updating status and informing participants, which specify when agents can access
what information and how the overall state of the negotiation (e.g. current highest bid) is
updated;
(e) rules for agreement formation, which specify when an agreement is reached (e.g. an English
auction ends with agreement if an acceptable bid is not exceeded by another bid within a
specied time period);
(f) termination rules, which specify under what conditions the negotiation terminates (successfully
or unsuccessfully);
5. a number of participants, with their internal decision-making components (e.g. their architectures,
proposal evaluation logic etc.) and their negotiation strategies;
This paper is specically concerned with the design of the participants in a negotiation framework, and in
particular with their strategies. To this end, Figure 1 depicts the scope of our methodology, which has the
specic purpose of helping designers of participating agents specify their agents' negotiation strategies. We
are hence not concerned with guiding software engineers in designing the rules of negotiation or specifying
languages for describing agreements etc. In fact, we assume a negotiation framework or mechanisms is
given and specied, formally or informally, in some form. However, since the eectiveness of strategies
is highly dependent on the nature of the underlying negotiation framework (rules, templates etc.), the
methodology also guides agent strategy designers in distilling framework characteristics that are relevant
and useful for strategy design.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 8
Stage IV: Construct￿
Tactics & Strategies￿
Stage II: Distill￿
Capabilities Model￿
Stage I: Specify￿
Objectives Model￿
Stage V: Test &￿
Refine￿
Stage III: Construct￿
Environment Model￿
Figure 2: Stages of the methodology
3 A Methodology for Strategy Design
In this section, we introduce the STRATUM (for STRATegy via Unorthodox Methodology)3 method-
ology for designing agent negotiation strategies.
The main function of the STRATUM methodology is to guide the designer of negotiation strategies
from domain and requirements analysis to producing modular high-level specications of strategies. These
specications should be generic enough to provide exibility in the underlying implementation details and
specic enough to provide thorough and useful guidance for programming strategies.
Typically, methodologies for software construction comprise a number of stages. Each stage may
result in one or more models that describe various aspects of the problem or the system using some
informal or formal abstraction or language. STRATUM consists of the stages described in Figure 2.
The stages arose from our earlier work on characterising strategic factors in negotiation (Rahwan et al.,
2003). These stages should not be understood as a strictly sequential process. The arrows represent the
overall direction of logical dependency between the models, but the designer may do the development
by iterative renement across stages. In the next sub-sections, we discuss each of these stages in more
detail.
3.1 Stage I: Specify Objectives Model
The Objectives Model (OM) species the objectives of the agent. This may be as simple as \maximise
own expected utility," or involve a more complex specication of the types of goals the agent needs
to achieve in the world (e.g. to increase the market share and minimise negotiation time), the safety
conditions it has to maintain (e.g. maintain minimum budget decit), the constraints imposed on these
3The name illustrates that this methodology does not follow the traditional game-theoretic approach. The word stratum
is the singular of strata (a set of layers) and refers to the compositional construction of strategies from simple tactics and
capabilities.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 9
objectives (e.g. never concede on quality) and so on. The OM may be expressed using natural language
statements, but may also be specied formally, for example using some objective or utility function.
We assume that we are dealing only with purposeful agents. Hence, each party to a negotiation
may be assumed to have some objectives which lead it to enter into the negotiation interaction. These
objectives may be at the highest level of an agent's stack of goals or they may not be, in which case
they may support some other, even higher, goals. Entering into a particular negotiation interaction over
certain resources with particular agents at a particular time, will, the agent believes, assist it in seeking
to achieve these goals.
An agent's negotiation objectives may be a particular agreement to divide the scarce resources under
discussion. Such an outcome, however, is not the only objective an agent may have. Indeed, an agent may
enter into an interaction with no intention of seeking a division of the resources in question, but merely
to confuse, distract, or otherwise delude the other participants, or even non-participants. An agent may
also engage in a negotiation interaction to acquire information about a new domain, as when potential
house-buyers participate in auctions in order, not to purchase a house, but to educate themselves about
prevailing house prices, or even about the auction process itself.
Agents may even enter into a negotiation interaction with one counterpart in order to have a stronger
negotiation position relative to another counterpart in a separate interaction; business-to-business ne-
gotiations often involve such parallel, competitive negotiations (Lilien et al., 1992, Chapter 3). These
objectives are all valid | and, by any denition, rational | objectives from a negotiation interaction.
Their wisdom, feasibility, or ethical content, though, are separate issues.
Note that the agent designer may not know precisely, at design time, in what encounters and with
what counterparts the agent will be engaged. However, since agents are assumed to be \goal directed"
or \purposeful," it should be possible to spell out their overall objective. This overall objective may be
realised in dierent ways depending on the type of encounter. Such detail is specied in stages III and
IV, which are described below.
3.2 Stage II: Distill Capabilities Model
A key inuencing factor on strategy design is the interaction capabilities of the agent negotiator | what
the agent is capable of doing in the interaction. These capabilities constitute the agent's Capabilities
Model (CM). These interaction capabilities are mainly characterised by the interaction protocol the agents
use. We assume that the protocol is already given by the negotiation host designer (e.g. specication of
auction rules or communication language). Two main types of capabilities may exist:
1. Dialogical abilities: These specify what the agent is capable of uttering to other agents. Such
capabilities may be specied in terms of the communication language used and the protocol rules
that govern the use of this language. Capabilities may also be constrained through some system
of value, such as a system for tracking agents' commitments to check their consistency (MaudetSTRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 10
and Chaib-draa, 2003), or a system of reputation or trust that removes agents that behave in a
deceptive or misleading manner.
2. Relevant non-dialogical abilities: An agent may have non-dialogical capabilities which may
impact its dialogical abilities. Consider, for example, an agent who wants to promise another agent
to deliver a fuel tank at a certain time. If the mechanism given prohibits agents from lying or
decommitting on their promises, then the agent must actually have access to a fuel tank and be
capable of moving it to the specied address at the specied time. In other words, the agent can
only make the promise (a dialogical ability) if it is capable of fullling the promise (a non-dialogical
ability).
Our interest here is in the dialogical abilities, and implicitly in the non-dialogical abilities { but only
insofar as the latter contribute to the former. So, for example, an agent's ability to inict physical
damage on another agent is only relevant to negotiation if this ability can be used to create dialogical
threats against that agent, such as \if you do not accept my proposal, I will hurt you." Finally, we stress
that here, we are not interested in the specics of the agent's internal capabilities (e.g. its ability to
evaluate an oer or generate preferences), but only in the dialogical manifestations of such abilities (e.g.
the ability to communicate desires to other preferences).
At the bottom level, an agent engaged in a negotiation interaction must be able to make utterances
which are legal according to the rules of the protocol. Above this level are some higher-order capabilities,
which may, depending on the specic protocol, require utterance of a sequence of locutions to be eected.
Typical types of dialogical capabilities needed in a negotiation encounter are listed in Table 1. This set of
capabilities was compiled based on observations of the automated negotiation literature (Jennings et al.,
2001) as well as literature on human negotiation (Young, 2001; Lewicki et al., 2003). A specic protocol
may enable only a subset of these capabilities. Moreover, a specic protocol may enable only certain
sub-types of these capabilities. For example, a protocol may enable an agent to provide information
proactively (capability C4) about its preferences, but not its beliefs. In any case, the agent designer must
have a clear picture of the agent's dialogical capabilities.
Of course, an agent may be said to also have capabilities which are complex combinations of these. For
example, the ability to prevaricate (Dunne, 2003) may be constructed from abilities to: request irrelevant
information; provide irrelevant, misleading or confusing information; or repeat previous questions or
statements. Such capabilities may constitute negotiation tactics or strategies and will be discussed in
section 3.4 below.
The CM is specied by the agent designer as a list of capabilities, which is a sub-set of the list given
in Table 1. In addition, the designer could provide a detailed description of how each capability can be
performed. This may include, for example, the protocol utterances that facilitate each capability, or its
enabling non-dialogical capabilities.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 11
Capability Explanation
C1 Make proposals Proposing potential deals to the counterpart.
C2 Accept proposals {
C3 Reject proposals {
C4 Present information
proactively
An agent may present information in order to inuence a counterparty's beliefs,
preferences, intentions etc.
C5 Seek information
from a counterpart
Participants may have varying abilities to extract information from one another,
for example, due to diering levels of authority in a social structure.
C6 Provide information
reactively
Agents may have diering capabilities to provide information to one another; some
agents may not be able to lie, or to answer evasively, for example.
C7 Seek to exert pressure
on counterpart
An agent might be able to threaten or reward other participants for accepting
certain deals (Kraus et al., 1998; Sierra et al., 1998), e.g. using authority.
C8 Retract Commit-
ments
Agents may have ability to retract commitments or proposals they have made
previously. Retraction has been studied, for example, in argumentation theory
(Walton and Krabbe, 1995) and in bargaining (Sandholm and Lesser, 2002).
C9 Withdraw Truly autonomous agents should have the ability to withdraw from any interaction
at any stage. Agents may also have the ability to threaten to withdraw.
C10 Re-enter Some auction protocols allow agents to withdraw form auctions and re-enter them
later.
C11 Do nothing Be passive and wait until conditions change; E.g. until market prices go down, or
until counterpart concedes because of his/her time constraints.
Table 1: Common Types of Dialogical Capabilities in a Negotiation EncounterSTRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 12
When identifying the agent's capabilities, the designer also needs to take account of constraints on
the exercise of any potential capabilities. Such constraints could include:
1. Interaction Protocol: The rules of the negotiation interaction protocol may preclude or require
certain utterances or certain types of utterances by agents at particular times in an interaction.
The FIPA Agent Communications Language, FIPA ACL, for example, requires agent sincerity:
only statements which are believed by an agent may be uttered using the inform locution (FIPA,
2001). In principle, such a condition must severely limit the use of FIPA ACL for negotiations.
2. Values: By values, we refer to the \criteria" that motivate and constrain the agents' behaviour.
Examples of such values include \maximising expected utility," \maximising social welfare," or
\avoiding deceptive behaviour." The agent's values may preclude or require certain behaviours and
so constrain the potential capabilities of the agent. Young (2001), for example, argues that the
strategies of human negotiators are signicantly inuenced by the value of maintaining their social
identity.
3. Resource Constraints: Time, memory or processing limitations on an agent may limit its capabilities
in a negotiation interaction.
3.3 Stage III: Construct Environment Model
This stage involves providing some representation of the negotiation environment, including the nego-
tiation counterparts, for the sake of reasoning about them. The result constitutes what we refer to as
the Environment Model (EM) model. Reasoning about this model, either by the strategy designer at
design-time, or by the automated agent at run-time, would provide a basis for the design and selection
of appropriate strategies.
The environment model describes one or more of the following:
 Model of counterpart: This model captures how the negotiation counterparts behave, the in-
formation they may have, or how they are likely to behave. For example, an agent wishing to
acquire a resource may attempt to model the negotiation behaviour of the providers of these re-
sources. Providers may be hard, using set prices, or they may be soft, conceding on price after a
few bargaining rounds.
 Model of peer: This model captures how other negotiators behave in the system. For example,
an agent wishing to acquire a resource may attempt to model other competing consumers of that
resource. If there are many consumers with aggressive demand, this may give providers extra market
power and hence decrease their willingness to concede with other consumers.
 Model of external conditions: Instead of modelling specic behaviour of counterparts or peers,
an agent may attempt to model the external conditions that aect these behaviours. For example,STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 13
Counterparts & Peers
- Aggressiveness: How aggressively is the peer or counterpart buying, selling
or bidding?
- Informativeness: How much does the counterpart or peer know? What
information do they have access to?
- Trustworthiness: Can peer or counterpart be trusted to fulll promises,
provide truthful information etc.?
External Conditions
- Rate of change: Are there patterns that capture change in external condi-
tions, such as resource supply, demand, prices etc.? What factors are these
conditions aected by?
- Competitiveness: How competitive are other agents? (This can be seen as
a generalisation of the aggressiveness attitude to multiple agents).
Table 2: Typical Environment Characteristics
the designer of an agent bidding in an exchange over oil stocks may attempt to consider the expected
economic conditions that would aect oil supplies and consequently demand and prices. It is notable
that the model of external conditions only captures the agent's perception of these conditions, and
hence does not necessarily reect the actual conditions.
Modelling other agents is a growing area of research, and techniques range from probabilistic modelling
of individual agent beliefs (Milch and Koller, 2000; Gal and Pfeer, 2003) to qualitative modelling of group
mental attitudes (Boella and van der Torre, 2004). Modelling the economic conditions has also begun
to receive some attention in the automated negotiation literature. For example, He et al. (2003) enable
agents to model the \state of the marketplace," based on observations of supply and demand, and adjust
their bidding strategies accordingly using a meta-strategy based on pre-programmed fuzzy rules.
STRATUM does not prescribe a particular method for modelling the environment, as dierent meth-
ods would be more suitable for dierent types of negotiation frameworks. However, we do provide a list
of typical environment features that the strategy designer could look for. These features, described in
table 2, can be used as a blueprint to guide the selection of the most appropriate environment modelling
method.
3.4 Stage IV: Construct Tactics and Strategies
With the objectives identied, capabilities claried and environment understood, we can proceed to
designing actual strategies. This process constitutes the Tactic and Strategy Design Stage. Intuitively,
tactics represent detailed low-level patterns of behaviour, while strategies represent more sophisticated
negotiation behaviour that makes use of simpler tactics.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 14
3.4.1 Goal Decomposition vs. Tactic Composition
As stated earlier, we assume an agent enters a particular negotiation interaction over particular resources
using a particular interaction protocol with particular counterpart agents at a particular time, in order to
achieve its negotiation objectives. In order to achieve these objectives, the agent may attempt to achieve
some sub-objectives, with the belief that such sub-objectives assist in realizing the overall negotiation
objectives.4 Sub-objectives themselves may be further decomposed into lower-level sub-sub-objectives
and so on. We can therefore see the process of strategy design in a compositional fashion.5
For example, a potential buyer entering into a negotiation with a car-dealer aiming to buy a car may
seek to achieve this negotiation objective by realizing each of the following sub-objectives (in sequence):
X. Learning about the alternative models available from the dealer;
Y. Establishing a preference ordering over some or all of these models; and
Z. Getting a cheap price for the most-preferred model.
The buyer might achieve the rst sub-objective by posing a series of questions to the car dealer. The
second sub-objective may be achieved by introspection, perhaps involving a process of comparison of the
expected utilities of dierent models (Roberts and Lattin, 1991). To achieve the third sub-objective, the
buyer may seek to achieve two lower-level objectives:
Z.1 Informing the dealer about an oer made by a competing dealer; and
Z.2 Bargaining with the dealer through an exchange of oers.
Each of these sub-sub-objectives may be achieved directly by making a series of utterances, or through
decomposition into further sub-objectives and so on. This process guides the design of tactics and
strategies.
Given this, Figure 3 depicts the interleaving processes of decomposing negotiation objectives and
composing capabilities. Objectives are decomposed in a top-down fashion, while capabilities are composed
in a bottom-up fashion in order to construct tactics and strategies that achieve these objectives. For
example, to achieve the main negotiation objective, the designer may specify that the agent needs to
achieve sub-objectives SO-1 through to SO-n. Each of these sub-objectives may need to be further
decomposed into sub-sub-objectives, and so on. The same thing takes place, bottom-up, while composing
tactics from capabilities. In the Figure, the arrow between the two trapezoids denotes that capability
4This hierarchical objectives structure has a structural similarity to the landmarks theory of conversation protocols of
Kumar et al. (2002). However, our approach concerns only the objectives of an individual agent and not the joint goals of
all participants to an interaction.
5When describing the negotiation objectives and strategies, we use the terms \objective" and \sub-objective" deliberately
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Figure 3: Decomposing objectives top-down; composing capabilities bottom-up
description is informed by the decomposition of objectives and, vice versa, objectives decomposition is
informed by the capabilities available.
In the process of objective decomposition and strategy composition, various types of interdependencies
may be revealed. First, some objectives may be found to be unachievable because the agent simply
does not have the required capabilities. For example, if an agent is not allowed to withdraw from the
negotiation, then it cannot threaten to do so. In such cases, alternative sub-objectives should be identied
in order to achieve the main negotiation objective.
Similarly, the parallel inspection of objectives and capabilities may reveal new possible objectives
and/or tactics/strategies. More specically, after attempting to map a given sub-objective to a com-
bination of capabilities, the designer may discover that the capabilities can be combined in a way not
previously thought of. This combination could achieve a new, alternative sub-objective that proves to be
useful.
Objective decomposition and strategy composition may also reveal conicts among two or more ob-
jectives, for example because they require the use of mutually exclusive capabilities. In such cases, the
designer should consider trade-os between dierent conicting objectives or seek alternative ways in
which conict could be avoided. The same could be said about discovering conicts among two or more
capabilities, tactics or strategies, which means they should not be used in combination.
At the end of this stage, there must be a correspondence between the objectives hierarchy and the
tactics/strategies hierarchy. In other words, each objective or sub-objective, etc., must be achievable
through a particular tactic or combination of tactics, and each tactic must have an objective or sub-
objective, etc., as its purpose. This correspondence need not be a one-to-one mapping, however, since a
single tactic may contribute to more than one objective, and a single objective may require more than
one tactic. However, the lack of one-to-one mapping reveals discrepancy in abstraction between the two
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3.4.2 Composing Tactics and Strategies
We now list a number of possible low-level tactics (or equivalently, low-level sub-objectives), which may
contribute to an agent's achievement of its negotiation objectives. To date, no comprehensive list of all
possible applicable negotiation tactics is available in the multi-agent literature or in the literature on
human negotiation. Therefore, we list those tactics inspired by the multi-agent negotiation literature
as well as informal advice to human negotiation participants (Fisher et al., 1991; Young, 2001; Lewicki
et al., 2003).
1. Seek to change a counterpart's beliefs. One participant in a negotiation may judge it to be
in its interests to have other participants believe certain propositions about the beliefs, intentions,
preferences, or constraints of the rst participant, or about the domain in question. These propo-
sitions may be true or false. Providing information to the counterparts may enable an agent to
explain the reasons for its beliefs, preferences etc. It has been argued (Fisher et al., 1991; Rahwan
et al., 2003) that agreement is more likely in negotiation interactions when participants understand
each others' interests (desires, preferences, goals etc.) rather than their current positions.
2. Gain a better understanding of a counterpart. An agent may have uncertain or incomplete
information about its counterpart. Moreover, counterparts may be seeking to mislead a participant
about their beliefs, intentions, preferences, constraints etc., or about the domain. An agent may
then seek to gain a better understanding of its counterparts' true mental states or constraints.
3. Seek to discuss a particular issue. By moving the interaction towards particular issues, a
participant may be able to frame the problem in certain ways and thus inuence the mental states
of its counterparts. A seller of a particular make of car, for example, may seek to turn the topic of
discussions with potential buyers towards attributes on which this make of car scores highly.
4. Seek to avoid discussion. For the same reasons, a participant may wish to steer discussion away
from particular issues.
5. Seek fast termination. An agent with time or processing resource constraints might seek a fast
resolution or termination of the negotiation.
6. Seek to delay. An agent who believes it has greater time or other resources than other participants
may seek to delay resolution of the interaction beyond the perceived resource limits of its counter-
party (Dunne, 2003).
7. Resist a counterpart. An agent may resist attempts by a counterpart to achieve one of the above
tactics.
With these main tactic types in mind, the strategy designer can start specifying tactics to be used by
the software agent. Specication of these tactics must take into account the actual capabilities of theSTRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 17
Tactic Name - Tactic 1
Dialogical
Objective
Get a cheap price for a preferred car model
Method - Inform the dealer about an oer made by a competing
dealer;
- Bargain with the dealer by exchanging oers.
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Capability C4 to provide information proactively;
- Capability C7 to exert pressure on the car dealer;
- Capabilities C1, C2 and C3 to make, accept and reject
proposals, respectively.
Rationality
Condition
None
Risk None
Table 3: Template for tactic and strategy description
agent (as discussed above). Tactic descriptions can also be compositional, so a tactic can make use of
other tactics already specied. In this respect, STRATUM provides the designer with a tactic or strategy
template, which is used to specify various tactics. A particular instantiation of this template is called a
tactic description or strategy description. The tactic template, instantiated with the tactic described in
section 3.4.2, is described in Table 3.
Each tactic description species the dialogical objective it is aimed at achieving. The method cell
contains an informal description of the dierent steps the tactic involves in order to achieve its dialogical
objective. The capabilities and sub-tactics used to execute these steps are specied in the following cell.
Finally, the rationality condition species any constraints on the rational use of the tactic. For example,
one may specify that it is only rational to make an oer to a counterpart if this oer is more preferred
to the counterpart than any previously made oer. Finally, the designer can list the potential risks of
enacting the strategy. This would enable the programmer of the strategy to take these risks into account
and provide suitable solutions or precautions.
The process of designing strategies using tactics is similar to designing tactics using primitive ca-
pabilities. We follow the intuitive distinction between strategies, which govern an entire interaction or
large parts of it, and tactics, which govern just a small number of utterances in an interaction. Hence,
one tactic may support multiple or competing strategies. For example, asking a direct question may
implement a strategy to gather information from another participant or it may implement a strategy to
delay resolution of the negotiation, or both. The methodology leaves to the designer the decision about
whether to refer to something as a \tactic" or a \strategy."6 One might argue that this renders the
6In the latter case, the template above would be referred to as a strategy template.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 18
distinction between tactics and strategies redundant. Nevertheless, this conceptual distinction may be
useful from the strategy designer's point of view. Indeed, this distinction has proved useful, for example,
in the work on natural language generation (McKeown, 1985).
3.5 Stage V: Test and Rene
The nal stage of the methodology is to test the strategy in terms of some appropriate criteria or metrics.
This testing may also lead to an iterative process of renement, based on the new ndings.
One way to perform testing is through empirical analysis. This would involve running simulations
of dierent dialogues using a variety of strategies. Simulation parameters could be varied in a number
of ways: among dierent strategies operating against a xed type of counterpart, among dierent types
of low level tactics within a particular generic strategy, in terms of the types of counterparts faced, the
information available to agents, or the agents' time constraints. Such simulations have started to be
used to analyse bargaining-based (Faratin, 2000), auction-based (He et al., 2003) and (to a lesser extent)
argument-based strategies (Ramchurn et al., 2003).
Another way to test strategies is through theoretical analysis. In game-theory, this is normally done
using equilibrium analysis, though this approach is usually aimed at designing the mechanism, not the
strategy. For strategies that cannot be studied using traditional game-theoretic techniques, it is often
hard to analyse strategies theoretically. Hybrid theoretical/empirical approaches have been used, where
the outcomes under dierent strategies are rst generated empirically, then studied analytically using
game-theoretic concepts. This approach has been used, for example, by Fatima et al. (2004) to study
bargaining in incomplete information settings. In economics, behavioural game theory (Camerer, 2003)
uses a hybrid approach whereby simulation experiments are rst designed and run. Then, regularities in
repeated interactions are explored and studied analytically to identify evolutionary equilibrium conditions.
3.6 Summary of the Methodology
The STRATUM methodology is summarised in Figure 4. Stages I, II and III produce the OM, CM and
EM respectively. Then Stage IV involves the simultaneous decomposition of objectives and composition of
capabilities in order to produce tactics that eventually form strategies. Finally, the testing and renement
stage leads to either (i) adjusting the environment and counterpart model, or (ii) repeating Stage IV with
dierent decompositions of objectives and compositions of capabilities.
It is worth noting that the clarity of the given multi-agent system specication inuences the ease in
which the OM, CM and EM can be captured by the negotiating agent designer. In some situations, the
designer is given explicit specications of the objectives, the agents' capabilities, and the environment
in which agents operate, making the OM, CM and EM easy to capture. This is the case, for example,
when the protocol is specied clearly in terms of declarative rules, or where the counterparts are fullySTRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 19
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Figure 4: Abstract view of the methodology
predictable (e.g., in complete information settings). On the other hand, if the multi-agent system is not
thoroughly specied, the strategy designer needs to make these implicit models explicit.
4 Applying the Methodology
In this section, we demonstrate, through two case studies, how the STRATUM methodology can be used
to aid the design of tactics and strategies in particular negotiation frameworks. In the rst case study,
we explore an existing strategy used in the Trading Agent Competition (TAC, 2003) and demonstrate
that STRATUM captures notions that the designers have included in the design of their strategy. In the
second case study, we present another case study which addresses a dierent style of negotiation; namely
interest-based negotiation (IBN) between two agents (Rahwan, 2004).
We selected these two domains for our case studies because they exemplify signicantly dierent ap-
proaches to automated negotiation. The TAC domain involves multiple concurrent negotiations using a
variety of auction-based protocols. Here, the focus is on modelling the general dynamics of the environ-
ment and reacting accordingly. The IBN domain, on the other hand, involves a richer communication
language based on computational models of argumentation. Here, the focus is on modelling the nego-
tiation counterpart and planning an argumentation strategy to persuade the opponent of changing its
beliefs and goals.
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methodology in the case studies below. Instead, our aim is to give the reader a feel for how the dierent
stages of the methodology can be applied in particular, relatively rich, negotiation scenarios.
4.1 Case Study 1: Trading Agent Competition
We now deconstruct an existing strategy used by an agent participating in the Trading Agent Competi-
tion (TAC, 2003). Through this \rational deconstruction," our aim is to demonstrate that STRATUM
captures notions that the designers of this strategy have reasoned about as they designed their strat-
egy. Our aim is that this deconstructive exercise will help support our claims about the feasibility of
the methodology and its consistency with current actual practice. Specically, the analysis is based on
SouthamptonTAC (He and Jennings, 2003), a trading agent developed at the University of Southampton,
and one of the most successful agents in TAC2002.
We start with a brief description of TAC games.7 In a TAC game, there are eight software agents
that compete against each other in a variety of auctions to assemble travel packages for 64 customers (8
customers each). A package consists of (i) a round trip ight during a 5-day period between TACtown
and Tampa; and (ii) a stay at a particular hotel for every night between their arrival and departure.
Customer satisfaction is measured in terms of utility, and each agent attempts to maximise its customers'
utility, as measured against customer preference data that is randomly generated at the start of the
game. Agents can also bid for the optional entertainment package, which can provide additional utility.
There are dierent types of entertainment options. An individual game lasts 12 minutes and involves 28
auctions. Each component in a package is traded in a dierent type of auction:
{ Flights are sold in single seller auctions, for which the ask price is updated randomly every 24 to
32 seconds.
{ Hotels are traded in 16th price multi-unit English auctions. There are eight hotel auctions that
close in random order at the end of every minute after the 4th. When a hotel auction clears, it
allocates 16 rooms to agents that bid the 16 highest prices.
{ Entertainment tickets are randomly provided to agents, 12 tickets each, at the beginning of the
game. Then agents can trade their tickets in a continuous double auction (CDA), where agents can
buy and sell at any time before the game closes. Tickets are only useful to a customer if they are
for dierent events, on dierent dates, and for nights when the customer is in town.
Designing bidding strategies for TAC auctions has proved to be a challenging problem. There are many
interdependencies between dierent kinds of auctions (e.g. ights will be useless if the hotel rooms are
not available) and within the same auction (e.g. having an extra ticket for the same entertainment is
useless). This means that agents have to solve combinatorial optimisation problems in a very short time
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(Eriksson and Janson, 2002). Moreover, there is an inherent uncertainty in the domain (e.g. since ight
prices change randomly) and there is no way to predict precisely how other agents will behave.
Given this background, let us deconstruct SouthamptonTAC-02 based on STRATUM. Stage I (spec-
ifying objectives) is straightforward, since the objectives are explicitly stated in the form of the utility
formula that takes into account complex customer preferences over ight, hotel and entertainment com-
binations (see (TAC, 2003) for details). Each agent attempts to maximise its overall utility based on the
given customers' preferences.
Stage II (specifying capabilities) is again relatively simple. This is because the protocol allows
relatively few dialogical capabilities. Agents have the ability C1 of making proposals in the form of bids
according to the dierent auction protocol rules, the ability C2 to accept proposals in the entertainment
CDAs, and the ability C5 to seek information from counterparts indirectly by observing their bidding
behaviour. Finally, agents have the ability C11 (do nothing) by simply not making any bids. Agents are
not allowed to leave the game before it is over, nor enter the game after it starts. Moreover, agents have
no external non-dialogical abilities that may inuence their dialogical abilities.
The authors of SouthamptonTAC-02 invested a signicant eort into Stage III (constructing the
Environment Model). In the authors own words:
\Our post hoc analysis of the TAC2001 competition shows that an agent's performance de-
pends heavily on the risk attitude of its opponents." (He and Jennings, 2003, page 221)
This marks an explicit recognition by the authors of the importance of modelling the negotiation en-
vironment (or more precisely, peer agents in the environment). To this end, the authors identify three
types of environments, based on the prices of hotels: (i) competitive environments where the prices of
the hotels are very high, (ii) noncompetitive environments where agents can get cheap hotel rooms, and
(iii) semicompetitive environments which are in between. Environment type recognition is performed by
monitoring the hotel prices during the game. Recognition is based on fuzzy pattern recognition techniques,
which classify the environment based on the degrees of membership of the asking price in the fuzzy sets
representing the three environment types mentioned above.
Note that the authors did not use the prices of entertainment tickets or ight tickets as a measure of
competition. This is because they have observed that ight prices and entertainment tickets prices are
similar whether the game is competitive or non-competitive. It is the hotel closing prices that identify
the nature of the opponents.8
Let us now move to Stage IV (constructing tactics and strategies). Given the limited number of
dialogical abilities allowed, tactics in TAC are mainly characterised by the following two families: seeking
to delay and seeking fast termination. In other words, tactics are mainly time-dependent. The precise
way in which agents delay or speed up their buying and selling, and the reasons for doing so (e.g. based
on price prediction), are what constitutes TAC strategies.
8Based on personal communication with the designers of SouthamptonTAC-02 (He, 2004).STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 22
The authors begin with the main objective in mind: to maximise the utility. Then, they divide
this objective into the following sub-objectives: (i) predicting the hotel closing prices; (ii) allocating
ights, hotels and entertainment tickets obtained to the eight customers so that utility is maximised; (iii)
deciding when to bid in the ights auctions; (iv) deciding what entertainment tickets to buy and sell in
the continuous double auctions; and (v) deciding what hotel auction to bid in and at what price (He,
2004).
Note that objectives (i) and (ii) above are not dialogical objectives since they involve internal cal-
culations by the agent rather than interaction with other agents. The rst objective is achieved using
fuzzy rules, while the second is achieved using an integer and linear programming solver. Among the
three remaining objectives, our interest in the remainder of this section is in the strategy used to achieve
objective (iii) for deciding when to bid for ight tickets.
Based on observations during the earlier TAC-01 competition, the authors of SouthamptonTAC-02
recognised the need for adapting to the dierent types of environments described above. The authors
characterise a risk-averse (RA) tactic as one where the agent buys a small number of ight tickets at
the beginning of the game and bids for hotels according to the situation as the game progresses. A
risk-seeking (RS) tactic, on the other hand, is one where the agent buys a large number of ight tickets
at the beginning of the game, and therefore does not change its customers' travel plans often during the
game. The authors state the following observation about the risk-averse tactic, based on their experience
in TAC2001:
\a risk-averse agent ... is highly exible and copes well when there is a signicant degree of
competition and the hotel prices are high ... In this way, it avoids buying extra hotels which
cost extra money. Also, the agent can receive optimal utility by not shortening the stay of its
customers." (He and Jennings, 2003, pages 221, 226)
The authors also make the following observation about the risk-seeking strategy:
\a risk-seeking agent ... does well in environments in which hotels are cheap. For example,
when a hotel price goes up sharply, a risk-averse agent would stop bidding on that hotel
(changing the stay to a counterpart hotel or reducing the trip period). In contrast, a risk-
seeking agent will insist on bidding for that hotel, although the price is very high. In so doing,
it hopes that the price will eventually stabilise (hence the risk) ... (It) is highly eective in
noncompetitive environments ... because there is little competition in hotel bidding and the
agent can always obtain what it wants." (He and Jennings, 2003, page 222, 226)
It is possible to characterise the above observations, which guided the design of the SouthamptonTAC-
02 strategy, using STRATUM tactic templates. The risk-averse and risk-seeking tactics are encoded in
Tables 4 and 5 respectively.
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Tactic Name Risk-Averse Tactic (RA)
Dialogical
Objective
- Avoid buying extra expensive hotel bookings
- Optimise utility by getting the lengths of customers' visits right
Method - Buy small number of ight tickets at the beginning;
- Bid on hotels if prices are not very high; Otherwise, switch to the
other hotel type or change the journey;
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Ability C1 (making proposals/bids)
- ability C5 (seek information) by observing other agents' bidding
behaviour
- ability C11 (do nothing)
Rationality
Condition
Environment is competitive
Risk If the environment is noncompetitive, the agent misses out on op-
portunities to optimise length of trips
Table 4: Risk-averse tactic specication
Tactic Name Risk-Seeking Tactic (RS)
Dialogical
Objective
Optimise holiday allocation, and take advantage of lack of compe-
tition in order to get the hotels it wants
Method - Buy large number of ight tickets at the start
- Purchase suitable hotels later, without changing ight bookings
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Ability C1 (making proposals/bids)
- ability C5 (seek information) by observing other agents' bidding
behaviour
- ability C11 (do nothing)
Rationality
Condition
- Environment is noncompetitive
- If hotel prices rise, they eventually stabilise
Risk - If environment gets competitive, hotel prices rise signicantly; as
a result, one must either pay high hotel prices, or change travel
plans and shorten stay, hence wasting travel tickets already bought
Table 5: Risk-seeking tactic speci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Tactic Name SouthamptonTAC-02 Adaptive Strategy
Dialogical
Objective
Maximise utility by adapting to changes in the environment
Method - If environment is competitive, use the risk-averse tactic
- If environment is noncompetitive, use risk-seeking tactic
- If environment is semicompetitive, use medium-risk tactic
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Risk-Averse Tactic
- Risk-Seeking Tactic
- Medium-Risk Tactic
Rationality
Condition
{
Risk {
Table 6: SouthamptonTAC-02 adaptive strategy
\After our experiences in TAC-01, we came to believe that there is no single best strategy
that can deal with all the dierent types of TAC environment. For example, a risk-seeking
agent ... is highly eective in noncompetitive environments. This is because there is little
competition in hotel bidding and the agent can always obtain what it wants. On the other
hand, delaying buying ights and shortening the stay of customers9 works well in competitive
games. For this reason, SouthamptonTAC dynamically varies its bidding strategy according
to its assessment of the environment type." (He and Jennings, 2003, page 226)
Based on this observation, SouthamptonTAC-02 uses a composed strategy which makes use of the risk-
seeking and risk-averse tactics, as well as a medium-risk tactic in semicompetitive environments.10 This
can be characterised in the STRATUM strategy template shown in Table 6.
Finally, for Stage V (testing and renement), SouthamptonTAC-02 strategy testing has been mainly
based on simulation. The authors set up a number of controlled experiments in their lab. In par-
ticular, they simulated games in which dierent combinations of SouthamptonTAC-02, risk-averse and
risk-seeking agents played (among 8 participants). They showed that SouthamptonTAC-02 does best in
competitive games, where the number of RS agents is big. The agent also does well in noncompetitive envi-
ronments, where there are many RA-agents. It turns out that the worst situation for SouthamptonTAC-02
is when all players are like itself, i.e. they are all adaptive. This is due to the fact that all agents switch
their strategies (i.e. adapt) at the same time, causing competition to be instantaneously shifted, or for
prices to uctuate constantly.
Further empirical results were obtained in the actual TAC2002 competition. TAC2002 results showed
that SouthamptonTAC-02 was ranked second, with a dierence of 0.8% from the top scoring agents.
9I.e. a risk-averse behaviour
10In this tactic, the agent buys most of the ights earlier and will only change travel plans if a signicant improvement
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However, since each game involves a wide variety of agents, it is dicult to draw strong comparative
results, such as whether the adaptive strategy made a real dierence.
In terms of strategy renement that took place before the actual competition, the authors denote
that it was due to empirical testing through controlled experiments that they discovered the need for
modelling the environment (He, 2004). This is what led them to using the fuzzy-logic-based method for
modelling the environment's competitiveness. The authors also indicated that their future work includes
improving the fuzzy modelling and pattern matching techniques (He and Jennings, 2004).
One possible future renement could be to attempt to deal with the problem that arises when multiple
identical adaptive agents populate the game. In such cases, adding some randomness to the timing of
agents' adaptation (e.g. by allowing an agent to switch its strategy before others do) might enable an
agent to overcome the problem mentioned above. Another renement suggestion is to include other
factors when modelling the environment. For example, instead of considering hotel prices as the only
measure of environment competitiveness, the strategy designers may take account of competitors' bidding
behaviour in entertainment and travel auctions.
4.2 Case Study 2: Interest-based Negotiation
Interest-based Negotiation (IBN) (Rahwan, 2004, Chapter 3) is a type of argumentation-based negotiation
frameworks (Rahwan et al., 2003). We begin by giving a brief overview of IBN before we discuss how
STRATUM may be applied to it.
The idea behind IBN is that in addition to exchanging proposals, acceptance and rejection messages,
agents can also exchange information about their underlying goal structures and use this information in
order to discover better deals. The IBN framework assumes agents are built using a deliberative archi-
tecture where they have beliefs about the environment and capabilities that dene what non-dialogical
actions they can perform. Agents have desire generation rules of the form C ) d(), which means that
if condition C is satised, then the agent will desire to achieve . Using desire generation rules, an agent
can generate explanatory arguments (Amgoud and Kaci, 2005) by which they conclude which desires to
adopt. Planning rules, on the other hand, are expressions of the form 1 ^  ^ n   and mean that
if 1;:::;n are achieved, then  is achieved. Using planning rules, an agent can generate plans (or
instrumental arguments) for achieving dierent desires. These plans have a hierarchical (tree) structure
in which the root node is a desire, all other nodes are goals that are instrumental towards achieving the
desire, and leaf nodes represent the resources required to execute the plan (i.e. required non-dialogical
capabilities). The relationship between beliefs, desires, goals and resources is depicted in Figure 5.
Agents calculate the utilities of dierent plans based on the plans' costs and the values of the desires
they achieve, resulting in a preference ordering over dierent plans. As agents receive new information
from the environment or other agents, their existing arguments may be defeated, resulting in change
in their preference. An argumentation-based semantics is given that speci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occur.11
The IBN protocol provides a way for agents to exchange information about their goal structures, and
to exchange arguments that can alter these goal structures. Locutions PROPOSE(:), ACCEPT(:) and
REJECT(:) allow agents to propose, accept and reject deals, respectively. The locution ASSERT(:) allows
an agent to make assertions about its own beliefs, goals, sub-goals or planning rules. Agents can ask
one another for information through the locutions QUESTION(:), which allows an agent to ask another
to state whether it agrees with a particular expression, and CHALLENGE(:), which allows an agent to
ask another for a justication of a particular asserted belief or desire. The locution RETRACT(:) enables
agents to retract previously asserted statements and proposed deals.
Note that locution CHALLENGE(:) allows agents to either ask for arguments (i.e. tentative proofs)
that justify a particular \belief" or ask for explanatory arguments that justify a particular \desire." This
cannot be used to ask for arguments supporting goals that are part of instrumental arguments. This is
because a goal is adopted both because it is instrumental towards a higher-level goal or desire, and because
it is achievable through some lower-level goals or capabilities. For this purpose, there are two additional
locutions that enable agents to ask for arguments supporting goals. Locution REQ-PURPOSE(:) allows
an agent to ask another for the higher-level purpose of a particular request (e.g. \why do you need to
travel?"). A similar locution REQ-ACHIEVE(:) allows an agent to ask another for the sub-plan that is
meant to achieve the goal in question (e.g. \how do you intend to book your ticket?").
The framework also has additional special predicates to use within the locutions. The predicate
prule(:) is used to exchange planning rules among agents. Another predicate instr(X;Y ) is used by one
agent to indicate that goals X are adopted because they are instrumental towards achieving higher-level
goals Y . Predicates des(:), bel(:) and int(:) denote the desire, belief and intention modalities, respectively.
Finally, the framework uses so-called commitment stores (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). Each agent
i has its own commitment store CS(i), which stores commitments that follow from dierent utterances
11For brevity, we do not present the full specication of the argumentation system used. The interested reader may refer
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Environment &￿
Counterpart Model￿
Objectives Model￿
Capabilities Model￿
STRATUM￿
Models￿
Maximising￿ desires &￿
minimising￿  cost￿
IBN￿  protocol￿
specification￿
Commitment Stores￿
IBN￿  Framework￿
Figure 6: Methodology models mapped in IBN
made by that agent. For example, when an agent makes an assertion, this assertion is inserted into
its commitment store. This enables other agents to later question or challenge these assertions. Also,
when a proposal is made, a conditional intention is inserted into the proposer's commitment store. The
conditional intention states that if the counterpart agrees on its part of the deal, then the proposer is
committed to intending its own part.
Stage I of the STRATUM methodology requires identifying the agent's objectives in the negotiation.
Objectives are specied explicitly in the IBN framework, making the OM easy to document. Each
agent attempts to achieve a set of desires and tries to reach a deal that maximises the utility it receives
(calculated as the dierence between the worth of desires achieved and the cost of the actions needed).12
Stage II of the methodology requires dening the agent's capabilities, which constitute the CM. These
are also explicitly specied already. In terms of the typology in table 1, the IBN protocol presented
in (Rahwan, 2004) enables, in some form or another, all capabilities except C7 (exerting pressure on
a counterpart). Agents can propose, accept and reject deals; they can also make assertions, retract
commitments, ask each other for information about each others' beliefs, or ask questions about how
they may achieve certain goals, or what a particular goal is useful for. They can also do nothing by
uttering the PASS locution. Note, however, that the exact type of capability is somewhat restricted.
For example, while an agent can request information about the counterpart's higher-level and lower-level
goals (through the REQ-PURPOSE(:) and REQ-ACHIEVE(:) locutions) and about the counterpart's beliefs
(using the QUESTION(:) and CHALLENGE(:) locutions), the agent is not able to ask the counterpart about
the reason for believing a certain planning rule.
Moving to Stage III (constructing the Environment Model EM), we rst know that both agents use
the same underlying reasoning mechanisms. This is an important assumption, since if the counterpart does
not have an explicit representation of underlying goals, for example, then it does not make sense to ask
that counterpart about the purpose of a particular request. In IBN, an explicit model of the counterpart
12Note that this uses a di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is available at any time through its commitment stores. One may also attempt to guess other information
about the counterpart by inferring its beliefs, goals etc. from its utterances. This would benet from the
assumption that all agents have symmetric reasoning abilities. But for the purpose of this discussion,
commitment stores are sucient. Figure 6 summarises the mapping between the IBN framework and the
rst three models of the STRATUM methodology.
Stage IV involves dening tactics and strategies from capabilities, in light of some decomposition of
objectives. We now give an example of the kinds of analysis involved in Stage IV. Suppose we attempt to
design a strategy for our seller agent A1 to negotiate with another buyer agent A2. As strategy designers,
we would like to design a particular strategy that contributes to A1's objective, and we want this strategy
to be suitable for a situation where A2 has already proposed some deal D to our agent, and that D is not
acceptable to A1. One way to achieve A1's negotiation objective is to get A2 to accept another deal D0
which is preferred by A1. The most trivial strategy to achieve this is to oer D0 to A2. This is claried
in the following typical bargaining dialogue:
a2: PROPOSE(A2;A1;D)
a1: REJECT(A1;A2;D)
a2: PASS(A2)
a1: PROPOSE(A1;A2;D0)
If the above attempt fails, the only potential solution is to propose other alternative deals D00, D000
etc. However, IBN enables alternative ways to reach a solution, by providing agents with a wider set
of dialogical abilities. Reasoning about how these dialogical capabilities may inuence the outcome
requires an understanding of the eect of these capabilities on preferences. Knowing that in IBN, both
agents are assumed to have identical reasoning models, we can make the following observations about the
counterpart:
{ A2 might have rejected D0 because it has some goal g and it believes that D0 does not achieve g;
{ If A2 is persuaded that D0 does actually achieve g, then it might accept D0 (subject to other issues,
such as the costs involved);
Hence, based on the above understanding of the counterpart, we can construct a strategy that attempts
to persuade A2 that D0 does indeed achieve its goal(s). But rst, we need to explore how the IBN
agent capabilities can be composed to achieve such persuasion. Given that A1 has the ability C5 to seek
information about the purpose of a resource requested by A2, and to present new information about
planning rules, we can construct the following pattern to persuade A2 to accept D0:
{ A1 nds out about a goal g that A2 wants to achieve using resource r, which is part of deal D that
A2 requested;
{ A1 then argues that D0 can also achieve goal g;STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 29
Strategy Name S1
Dialogical
Objective
Cause counterpart to intend a deal that is more preferable to me
Method - Find out what deal the counterpart currently wants, call it D
- Find out what goal D is intended to achieve;
- Assert that D0 also achieves that goal;
- Oer deal D0
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Capability C5 (seek information)
- Capability C4 (present information proactively)
- Capability C1 (make a proposal)
Rationality
Condition
- Deal D0 must be acceptable to me, and more preferred to me than
deal D
Risk {
Table 7: Description of an example IBN strategy
{ A1 oers D0 to A2;
This strategy can be described in STRATUM as shown in table 7. The following dialogue sequence
demonstrates how this strategy can be encoded in the IBN protocol:
a2: PROPOSE(A2;A1;D)
this leads to inserting int(r) for each r 2 Resources(D) to A2's commitment store CS(A2),
where Resources(D) denotes the resource required in deal D
a1: REJECT(A1;A2;D)
a2: PASS(A2)
a1: REQ-PURPOSE(A1;A2;r)
where r 2 D
a2: ASSERT(A2;A1;instr(r;g))
this leads to int(g) being inserted to CS(A2)
a1: ASSERT(A1;A2;prule(r1 ^  ^ rn  g))
a2: PASS(A2)
a1: PROPOSE(A1;A2;D0)
where r1;:::;rn 2 D0
If the strategy works, the above dialogue will be followed by an acceptance from agent A2 using the
utterance ACCEPT(A2;A1;D0). The following is a natural language description of a dialogue that uses
the above strategy.
a1: Why do you need the car?
a2: To travel to Sydney.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 30
Tactic Name T1
Dialogical
Objective
Cause counterpart to abandon some intended deal D
Method - Ask the counterpart whether it intends some goal g0;
- Argue that D has the undesirable side-eect of precluding g0
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Ability to provide information about consequences
Rationality
Condition
{
Risk {
Table 8: Tactic description of an IBN tactic
a1: You can also go to Sydney by ying there.
a2: But this would be even more expensive.
a1: We're in the low-season, so I can book you a ight for only $250.13
a2: That's great. Go ahead and book it please.
In the above example, agent A1 simply presents information about an alternative way of achieving the goal
of going to Sydney. Whether A2 accepts this alternative might depend on other issues, such as whether A2
has petrol vouchers, or whether A2 wishes to visit a friend who lives on the way to Sydney. Therefore, a
more aggressive strategy would be to try to make the driving alternative itself less appealing. As a result,
this might make the ying option more preferable, hence increasing the likelihood of its acceptance. This
new new approach can be described by the following pattern:
{ A1 nds out about a goal g that A2 wants to achieve using resource r, which is part of deal D that
A2 requested;
{ A1 then argues that D0 can also achieve goal g;
{ A1 persuades A2 that its previous deal D does not achieve goal g;
{ A1 oers D0 to A2;
Note that this strategy is similar to strategy S1, except that it requires A1 to persuade A2 to abandon
D. So before we specify the new strategy, we need to specify a tactic for achieving such persuasion. One
way to do so is to show a \side eect" of D that was not known to A1 before. This tactic is described
in table 8, and is self explanatory. We can now describe the new strategy by referring to tactic T1. This
strategy is described in table 9.
The following is an illustration of how strategy S2 can be encoded in the IBN protocol.
13Of course, this dialogue assumes that A1 prefers to sell a ticket for $250 than hire out a car for $400.STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 31
Strategy Name S2
Dialogical
Objective
Cause the counterpart to intend a deal that is more preferable to
me
Method - Find out what deal the counterpart currently wants, call it D;
- Find out what goal D is intended to achieve, call this goal g;
- Assert that D0 also achieves that goal;
- Cause counterpart to no-longer intend D;
- Oer deal D0
Capabilities &
Sub-Tactics Used
- Capability C5 (seek information)
- Capability C4 (present information proactively)
- Tactic T1 to cause counterpart to abandon D
- Capability C1 (make a proposal)
Rationality
Condition
- Deal D0 must be acceptable to me, and more preferred to me than
deal D
Risk - After abandoning deal D, the counterpart may still not accept
deal D0, for some other reason. As a result, if our agent prefers
accepting D to nothing, and it is not possible to persuade the
counterpart to intend D again, then our agent is worse o
Table 9: Description of an example IBN strategy
a2: PROPOSE(A2;A1;D)
this leads to inserting int(r) for each r 2 Resources(D) to A2's commitment store CS(A2)
a1: REJECT(A1;A2;D)
a2: PASS(A2)
a1: REQ-PURPOSE(A1;A2;r)
where r 2 D
a2: ASSERT(A2;A1;instr(r;g))
this leads to int(g) being inserted to CS(A2)
a1: QUESTION(A1;A2;int(g0))
a2: ASSERT(A2;A1;int(g0))
a1: ASSERT(A1;A2;prule(r1 ^  ^ rn  :g0))
where r1 ^  ^ rn  Resources(D)
a2: PASS(A2)
a1: PROPOSE(A1;A2;D0)
where r1;:::;rn ( Resources(D0)
The following follow-up natural language dialogue illustrates the usage of the strategy:
a2: I still prefer to drive to Sydney.
a1: Are you collecting frequent 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a2: Yes!
a1: Because you are dropping the car in another state, you will not be able to get frequent yer
points by hiring this car.
a2: Oh! I thought I would. In that case, I prefer to y and get the points.
The risk associated with strategy S2, as shown in table 9, is claried in the following variant of the above
dialogue:
a2: I still prefer to drive to Sydney.
a1: Are you collecting frequent yer points?
a2: Yes!
a1: Because you are dropping the car in another state, you will not be able to get frequent yer
points by hiring this car.
a2: Oh! I thought I would. In that case, I don't want to hire a car, and I'd rather stay in Melbourne
for my holiday; I hate ying.
Finally, testing and renement of the strategies is performed in State V. This stage on its own may
require a separate study, because of the richness of the protocol and the complexity of possible dialogue
sequences. However, we shall briey discuss some possible directions.
One option is to perform empirical testing through simulation. In argument-based negotiation, such
types of studies have only been used for very simplistic dialogues (Jung et al., 2001; Karunatillake and
Jennings, 2004; Ramchurn et al., 2003), where variations in parameters are relatively easy to enumerate
(e.g. by varying the strength of threats and promises based on trust). The lack of extensive research in
this area is largely due to the complexity of the protocol, and the fact that no generic formal theory of
argument-based interaction protocols exists. The STRATUM methodology has the potential to enable
designers of multi-agent systems to follow a more systematic approach when enumerating variations of
strategy within richer protocols.
The other option for analysing IBN strategies is to perform theoretical analysis. This approach has
been used to study simple strategies in persuasion dialogues (Amgoud and Maudet, 2002), as well as in
inquiry and information seeking dialogues (Parsons et al., 2002), but not in negotiation dialogues as yet.
Torroni (2002) studies whether certain strategies lead to dialogue termination. The formal analysis is
facilitated by the fact that the system is specied using Abductive Logic Programs (Sadri et al., 2002).
This enabled the analysis of dialogues in relation to the underlying well-understood proof-theory. This
type of formal analysis may not be as simple for the IBN framework, since many parts of the framework
are described in a more or less \semantic" fashion (e.g. the generation of candidate intentions).STRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 33
4.3 Discussion
The long-term objective of the research reported in this paper is to bridge the gap between the theory
and practice of automated negotiation. To this end, it is important to identify the domain-independent
aspects of negotiating agent design in order to come up with general principles that can guide software
engineers in building such agents.
The case studies above provide a hands-on feel for how the methodology can be applied. They also
demonstrate how STRATUM can provide guidance to the process of strategy design in reasonably com-
plex, and signicantly dierent negotiation environments. The rst case study shows that our methodol-
ogy is consistent with current practice, since we were able to rationalise an existing TAC strategy using
STRATUM. The second case study, on the other hand, shows that the same primitives and processes
can be applied to design strategies for a very dierent type of negotiation environment, namely one that
involves an expressive argumentation-based protocol.
The applicability of STRATUM in such signicantly dierent domains demonstrates that the method-
ology's primitives and processes are suciently general to be applicable in a wide range of settings. In
this context, we note that this wide applicability of STRATUM was facilitated by our deliberate choice
to keep the methodology informal, rather than using a specic formal language.
We also believe the methodology has the potential to provide a common framework for comparison of
strategies across negotiation frameworks, hence guiding designers in selecting appropriate strategies based
on distilled domain characteristics. For example, the adaptive strategy described in case study 1 above
may be applicable in other domains where an agent is able to observe other agents' bidding behaviour.
Similarly, whenever the protocol enables agents to seek information about other agents' goals, strategy
S1 (See Table 7) may be applied in order to accelerate the process of nding a mutually acceptable deal.
Hence, the paper contributes to a vision discussed in an earlier paper (Jennings et al., 2001):
\...there are also a number of broader issues, which, to date, have received comparatively
little attention. These include ...the development of a best practice repository for negotiation
techniques. That is, a coherent resource that describes which negotiation techniques are best
suited to a given type of problem or domain (much like the way design patterns function in
object-oriented analysis and design)." (Jennings et al., 2001, page 212)
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented the STRATUM methodology for guiding the design of agent negotiation strategies.
STRATUM is the rst attempt to structure the process of strategy construction in non-game-theoretic
domains (i.e. in domains where the nature of the protocol and the limited information available make it
impossible to prescribe optimal strategies through mechanism design techniques (Dash et al., 2003)). We
demonstrated how the methodology can be used through two case studies. Moreover, we believe there isSTRATUM: A Methodology for Designing Heuristic Agent Negotiation Strategies 34
nothing in our model that is specic to one type of negotiation framework and so we believe it is generic.
However, additional studies are needed to better understand and conrm the scope of applicability of the
approach.
The hierarchical construction of strategies becomes particularly useful for designers of strategies for
rich negotiation dialogues, where agents have a large number of possible utterances (and hence, dialogical
abilities) that they can use. This is because STRATUM enables designers to reason about the objectives
of a negotiation strategy as a planning problem. This view of dialogue is consistent with the plan-based
theory of speech acts proposed by Cohen and Perrault (1979), which suggests that a \planning" view is
an adequate way to capture the way people reason about their utterances.
It is worth noting that it may be possible to exploit the hierarchical structure of objectives and
strategies in order enable agents to compose strategies at run-time. In fact, this is exactly what
SouthamptonTAC-02 does, since it varies its underlying tactic based on observations of the environ-
ment. In more complex dialogues, this would require the dependencies between objectives and tactics on
dierent levels to be represented formally in a way that can be processed by a computer program. Then
the reasoning required may be made possible using a hierarchical task planner (Erol et al., 1994). This
would enable agents to modify their strategies, or even their objectives, during negotiation. For example,
an agent might abandon an objective or a tactic if the agent perceives that this objective or tactic is not
currently achievable or is counterproductive because the negotiation counterpart is resistant to it. As
with any other intentions, the defeasibility of objectives in a computational agent requires some formal
mechanism for intention-reconsideration (Schut and Wooldridge, 2001).
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